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In 2010, the Venter lab announced that it had created the ﬁrst bacterium with an entirely synthetic gen-
ome. This was reported to be the ﬁrst instance of ‘artiﬁcial life,’ and in the ethical and policy discussions
that followed it was widely assumed that the creation of artiﬁcial life is in itself morally signiﬁcant. We
cast doubt on this assumption. First we offer an account of the creation of artiﬁcial life that distinguishes
this from the derivation of organisms from existing life and clarify what we mean in asking whether the
creation of artiﬁcial life has moral signiﬁcance. We then articulate and evaluate three attempts to estab-
lish that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁcant. These appeal to (1) the claim that the creation
of artiﬁcial life involves playing God, as expressed in three distinct formulations; (2) the claim that the
creation of artiﬁcial life will encourage reductionist attitudes toward the living world that undermine
the special moral value accorded to life; and (3) the worry that artiﬁcial organisms will have an uncertain
functional status and consequently an uncertain moral status. We argue that all three attempts to ground
the moral signiﬁcance of the creation of artiﬁcial life fail, because none of them establishes that the cre-
ation of artiﬁcial life is morally problematic in a way that the derivation of organisms from existing life
forms is not. We conclude that the decisive moral consideration is not how life is created but what non-
genealogical properties it possesses.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesIn 2010, staff at the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) reported the
creation of the ﬁrst bacteriumwith an entirely synthetic genome. A
variant on theMycoplasma mycoides genome was stitched together
from simple chemical building blocks and then inserted into a bac-
terium from a different Mycoplasma species whose genetic con-
tents had been removed. The result was a novel bacterium that
was capable of reproducing and performing other normal bacterial
functions (Gibson et al., 2010).
The JCVI’s creation was widely reported as the ﬁrst example of
artiﬁcial life. It is doubtful whether it was aptly characterised as
such, given that only the genome and none of the cytoplasmic
structures were synthesised by scientists (Bedau et al., 2010).
However, in this paper we take no committed stance on whether
the JCVI’s bacterium constituted artiﬁcial life. Instead, we consider
whether it would have mattered, morally, if it did. Even if JCVI sci-
entists did not create artiﬁcial life, this is an important question to
ask since future scientists may well do so.In the controversy that surrounded the JCVI’s creation, which
prompted a meeting of the U.S. Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues and an ensuing ethical report (2010), it
was widely assumed that the creation of artiﬁcial life is itselfmorally
signiﬁcant. In this article we aim to cast doubt on this assumption.
First we offer an account of what it is to create artiﬁcial life and
clarify what we mean in asking whether the creation of artiﬁcial life
has moral signiﬁcance. We then articulate and evaluate three
attempts to establish that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signif-
icant: one based on the concern that the creation of artiﬁcial life in-
volves playing God, one claiming that it will encourage reductionist
attitudes toward life, and one which argues that artiﬁcial organisms
will have uncertain moral status. We show that all three attempts fail.
1. Deﬁnitions
We shall ﬁrst lay out some key deﬁnitions.
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The creation of artiﬁcial life would have to consist, we assume,
in the creation of an artiﬁcial living entity, henceforth an ‘artiﬁcial
organism’.1 We will take an organism to be artiﬁcial just in case
either (1) all core elements of that organism were initially con-
structed from chemically simple, non-living components to the spec-
iﬁcation of a person or other natural rational being,2 or (2) it
descended from an organism (or pair of organisms in the case of sex-
ual creatures) that was constructed in this way.
There are several points to note about this deﬁnition. First, it
does not require that to qualify as artiﬁcial, an organism must be
novel in kind—by which we mean, substantially different in kind
(genetically or phenotypically) to any previously or currently exist-
ing organism. Had the JCVI’s creation been genetically and pheno-
typically identical to the wild type Mycoplasma mycoides, this
would not have affected its artiﬁciality. Second, whether the JCVI
bacterium qualiﬁes as artiﬁcial, on this deﬁnition, will depend on
whether the nuclear genome is the only ‘core element’ of a bacte-
rium—an assumption that many biologists would reject, given the
crucial developmental and homeostatic role played by various cel-
lular structures in the cytoplasm and membrane. Third, the quali-
ﬁed phrase ‘initially constructed’ is necessary because, once
organisms are ‘up and running’, they will frequently be capable
of maintaining themselves though exerting a causal inﬂuence on
their internal and external environment (Saborido, Mossio, &
Moreno, 2011). Whereas the parts of rationally designed machines
usually wear out with use, organisms will typically renew their
parts until death. We take it that if an animal were artiﬁcial when
ﬁrst created, it would remain artiﬁcial at the end of its life. Fourth,
we employ the disjunction ‘or it descended from . . . ’ to accommo-
date our view that a reproductive lineage descending from an arti-
ﬁcial organism or pair of organisms remains artiﬁcial in perpetuity
since it reﬂects a continuous causal process that originates in a sin-
gle artiﬁcial creation event (more on this below). And ﬁnally, ﬁfth,
we note that the above deﬁnition of artiﬁciality does not cover
domesticated plants and animals that result from selective breed-
ing, or even genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs), since these
are not constructed from chemically simple, non-living materials.
1.2. Moral signiﬁcance
Since we wish to assess the claim that the creation of artiﬁcial
life is morally signiﬁcant, it is necessary to say something about
how we understand moral signiﬁcance. There are various ways
in which this concept might be understood, but we wish to cap-
ture how it has been invoked in discussion of the creation of arti-
ﬁcial life. There, the thought has typically been that the creation
of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁcant in a fundamentally negative
way. We will take it to have such signiﬁcance just in case (a)
there are moral reasons not to create artiﬁcial organisms, or fac-
tors that weaken our moral reasons to create them, and (b) these
are speciﬁc to the creation of artiﬁcial organisms.3 The second
requirement, holding that the factors which bear negatively on
the creation of artiﬁcial organisms be speciﬁc to this practice, re-
quires some further elucidation. It implies that there are some con-
trasting practices to which these factors do not apply. But what are
those contrasting practices?1 We use the term ‘organism’ as a term of art here. In common usage, there may be li
organisms that are not living (such as deceased animals).
2 The term ‘natural’ is to be read as meaning ‘not supernatural’. This qualiﬁcation is ne
standard creationist or intelligent design-theoretic view of life, insofar as God is presum
‘artiﬁcial’. Note also that, as is clear from the deﬁnition, we do not take ‘artiﬁcial’ to mean
3 Note that it would not follow from the existence of moral reasons not to create artiﬁci
outweighed by moral reasons that speak in favour of creating artiﬁcial life.The creation of artiﬁcial organisms is most naturally contrasted
with the much more familiar practices whereby one organism is
derived from one or more others. People derive new organisms
from pre-existing ones, for example, by engaging in sexual rela-
tions with one another, undergoing or providing fertility treat-
ments, harvesting and planting seeds. In some cases, as in most
instances of normal human reproduction, the resulting organisms
satisfy neither of the conditions for artiﬁciality that we introduced
above—they are neither created from chemically simple compo-
nents, nor created to the speciﬁcations of a rational agent. In other
cases, the new organisms that we derive from existing ones are
created to the speciﬁcation of one or more rational agents who
envision a set of desirable organismic properties and manipulate
living processes to achieve (or approximate) that end. This is true
of domesticated plants and animals developed through selective
breeding programs. It is also true of GMOs, as well as organisms
that are generated via ‘directed evolution’ in the laboratory, where
desirable properties are intentionally selected, rather than engi-
neered in accordance with rational engineering principles
(see O’Malley, 2011).
Since the production of new organisms to the speciﬁcations of
rational agents is already widespread (and indeed has been since
the Agricultural Revolution), it would be surprising if those
alarmed by the prospect of creating artiﬁcial life were alarmed
by the created-to-speciﬁcation aspect of artiﬁcial organisms. If
they were, it would be difﬁcult to explain why the JCVI’s creation
was singled out for attention. It seems more plausible to assume,
then, that what alarms some has speciﬁcally to do with the fact
that artiﬁcial life forms would be produced to speciﬁcation from
chemically simple, non-living components.
This interpretation is supported by the emphasis that some
authors have placed on the claim that creating artiﬁcial life is onto-
logically more radical than the mere derivation or manipulation of
living things. Boldt and Müller (2008) put the point this way:
The shift from genetic engineering’s ‘manipulatio’ to synthetic
biology’s ‘creatio’ is a shift with considerable ethical signiﬁ-
cance . . . . In synthetic biology, the aim is not to amend an
organism with a certain quantity of altered characteristics (that
is, to manipulate); instead, it is to equip a completely unquali-
ﬁed organism with a new quality of being (that is, to create a
new form of life).
The ethically relevant contrast for artiﬁcial life, therefore, appears to
be the derivation of organisms from other life forms, irrespective of
the mode of derivation and regardless of whether it is carried out to
human speciﬁcation.
We can now reﬁne our conditions for moral signiﬁcance as fol-
lows. The creation of artiﬁcial life has moral signiﬁcance just in
case (a) there are reasons not to create artiﬁcial organisms, or fac-
tors which weaken our reasons to create them, and (b) these rea-
sons or factors would not apply—or would not apply with equal
force—to the derivation of similar life forms from previously exist-
ing life forms. ‘Similar organisms’ should be understood as refer-
ring to organisms possessing similar non-genealogical properties.
‘Derivation’ should be understood as describing the generation of
a new organism through the modiﬁcation of a continuous causal
process (for example, an unbroken chain of reproduction, cellular
mitosis, epigenesis, et cetera) that extends over space and time.ving entities that do not qualify as organisms (such as rainforests) and perhaps also
cessary because without it all organisms would be deemed artiﬁcial according to the
ed to be a rational agent—a result that is at odds with common usage of the term
inorganic or non-biological, although some might use the term in this way.
al life that there is a decisive objection against creating it, since these reasons may be
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for example, intentional genetic alterations and random sexual
recombination events.
The creation of a minimal bacterium by the JCVI stands in stark
contrast to the derivation of life. Although the JCVI’s synthetic gen-
ome contained only minor deviations from the naturally occurring
M. mycoides genome, and was in some informational sense ‘derived’
from the latter, the synthetic genome was not part of a continuous
causal process of genetic transmission linking the wild type organ-
ism with the derived organism. Rather, it was built de novo from
basic biological components, and then inserted into the cytoplasm
of an entirely different species of bacteria whose DNA had been
removed.
It is this element of ‘creatio’—the generation of novel organisms
de novo—that many authors ﬁnd ethically troublesome in relation
to synthetic biology, and which could potentially form the basis
of an argument that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁ-
cant. In what follows we develop and assess three prominent at-
tempts to ground the moral signiﬁcance of creating artiﬁcial life.
We ﬁnd each of them wanting.
2. Attempt one: playing God
An initial attempt to establish the moral signiﬁcance of creating
artiﬁcial life is suggested by the reception, in the popular press, of
the JCVI’s creation. A common refrain in this literature is that the
Institute’s staff members were ‘playing God’ (see, e.g., Alleyne,
2010; McCrae, 2010; Savulescu, 2010). Concerns about playing
God have been raised in relation to many different areas of the life
sciences, medicine and environmental policy, and though these
concerns have not been developed systematically in the philosoph-
ical literature, there has been some philosophical treatment of
them (see, for example, Coady, 2009; van den Belt, 2009). On the
basis of this treatment, it is possible to delineate at least three dif-
ferent variants of the concern about playing God. All of these could,
with some initial plausibility, be raised in relation to the creation of
artiﬁcial life.
An overtly religious variant of the playing God concern main-
tains that the putatively worrisome practice involves literally
usurping the proper role of some higher being or god. This worry
was raised in the context of the recombinant DNA project that
emerged in the 1970s (Goodﬁeld, 1977) and it has been raised with
some regularity in response to more recent attempts to modify
organisms through genetic engineering (Evans, 2002). This version
of the playing God concern maintains that humans should not
intervene in certain ‘forbidden’ realms of the natural world regard-
less of what the likely consequences of such interventions will be.
A second, fundamentally secular version of the playing God con-
cern maintains that agents who engage in the practice in question
thereby express objectionably grandiose or hubristic attitudes. This
worry has been raised, for example, in relation to the use of bio-
medical technologies to enhance one’s normal capacities or to pro-
duce ‘designer children’ through the genetic selection or
modiﬁcation of human embryos (Kass, 2003; Sandel, 2007). It is ar-
gued that these practices express arrogance and a drive to mastery
when the appropriate attitudes to take towards one’s capacities
and one’s children are attitudes of acceptance and gratitude (what
Sandel calls ‘giftedness’). Since this version of the playing God con-
cern focuses on the attitudes of the agent said to play God and not
on the consequences of his/her doing so, it sidesteps empirical de-
bates over the likely psychological, social, and environmental con-
sequences of the practice in question (Buchanan, 2011).4 We assume, for simplicity, that the process of creating an artiﬁcial organism is no mor
risk will depend on the nature of the organism that is produced.A third, also secular version of the playing God concern is
explicitly outcome-based, maintaining that the practice or inter-
vention in question involves overstepping the limits of human
knowledge, thus unwarrantedly risking unintended negative con-
sequences. Complex living systems are taken to exist in an optimal
but delicate equilibrium which human intervention is likely to dis-
rupt (Powell, 2010).
We shall set aside the theological variant of the playing God
concern and focus instead on the two secular variants. It is plausi-
ble that the creation of artiﬁcial life could, in some cases, raise both
of these concerns. It could express grandiose or hubristic attitudes,
and it could unwarrantedly risk negative consequences. It is highly
doubtful, though, whether the creation of artiﬁcial life would al-
ways (or even often) raise these concerns. For example, it is
implausible that any scientist who creates artiﬁcial life in order
to produce an effective pharmaceutical or a targeted medical treat-
ment must harbour grandiose attitudes or pose undue risks. What
is more important in the present context, however, is that it is not
clear that these two secular concerns about playing God apply
more powerfully to the creation of artiﬁcial life than they do to
the derivation of similar life.
Consider ﬁrst the risk-based variant of the playing God concern.
The seriousness of this concern, when raised in relation to the pro-
duction of new organisms, will depend on the level of risk posed by
the organism produced.4 But the risk that an organism poses de-
pends not on its etiology, but on its causal properties—that is, how
it interacts with other organisms and the environment. Organisms
derived from a dangerous pathogen like Bacillus anthracis (which
causes anthrax) are obviously far more dangerous than artiﬁcial ver-
sions of a benign microbe involved in the fermentation of dairy prod-
ucts. There is no reason to suppose that two organisms with the
same causal properties will pose different risks merely because
one was artiﬁcially created while the other was not.
At this point, it might be argued that we have understood the
risk-based variant of the playing God concern too narrowly. The
worry is not that particular instances of creating artiﬁcial life will
invariably pose greater risks than the derivation of similar life.
Rather, the worry is that creating artiﬁcial life is a type of practice
that would be associated with greater average or maximal risks
than the derivation of similar life. Because creatio involves greater
degrees of freedom than manipulatio, artiﬁcial organisms could,
and perhaps typically would, depart more radically, genetically
and phenotypically speaking, from the range of existing organisms
than would derived organisms. And perhaps this more radical
departure from existing variation would be associated with higher
average or maximal levels of risk to human health or the
environment.
One line of reasoning for this last view holds that endemic spe-
cies, communities and ecosystems are at high risk of being ravaged
by invaders, since they are not adapted to defend or compete
against these ‘alien’ intruders. The more alien the invaders are, so
the logic goes, the less likely endemic species or communities will,
as ‘naïve’ prey or competitors, be able to resist the novel predation
or competition pressures introduced by the invaders. Because arti-
ﬁcial organisms would typically be more alien than derived ones,
their creation would typically pose greater risks.
An opposing and arguably more plausible view is that the risk of
antagonistic interactions between introduced and endemic organ-
isms is actually less the more alien the introduced organism is. This
is because strategic co-evolution, such as that characterizing pred-
ator–prey (and host–parasite) dynamics, typically requires
specialized adaptations that can only evolve through prolongede or less risky than the process of deriving a similar organism. Thus, any difference in
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conclusion, therefore, is that artiﬁcial organisms that differ radi-
cally from existing ones would, generally speaking, pose lesser
risks to endemic fauna than organisms that differ less radically
or even only slightly from their natural counterparts, since radi-
cally different artiﬁcial organisms would be unlikely to compete
over niches with naturally existing organisms.5 These evolutionary
considerations support scepticism regarding the claim that artiﬁcial
organisms would typically pose levels of risk greater than those
posed by derived organisms.
There are also reasons to be sceptical about the suggestion that
artiﬁcial organisms would pose greater maximal risks than derived
organisms. It is possible that artiﬁcial organisms could pose ex-
treme risks that involve an existential threat to humanity. But
the same is true of derived organisms. Indeed, currently existing
organisms, such as smallpox or Ebola, already pose extreme, possi-
bly existential risks, and such organisms could be genetically mod-
iﬁed so as to make them even more lethal.
More importantly, even if the creation of artiﬁcial life would
pose greater average or maximal risks than the derivation of life,
it is not clear that this would have any moral signiﬁcance. This is
because an interpretation of the risk-based playing God concern
which focuses on the average or maximal level of risk that a type
of activity poses lacks much of the intuitive appeal of the original,
narrower interpretation which focuses on the actual level of risk
posed by a particular activity; it ends up using a sledgehammer
where a scalpel will do. If a particular instance of creating artiﬁcial
life were associated with risks of negative consequences, it could
be morally problematic. However, it is difﬁcult to see why the cre-
ation of artiﬁcial life should be thought morally problematic in
cases where it is not associated with such risksmerely because other
instances of creating artiﬁcial life commonly are risky. The plausi-
bility of the risk-based variant of the playing God concern derives
from the thought that there are moral reasons not to risk negative
consequences, not from the thought that there are moral reasons
not to engage in practices that are typically risky.
One might claim that we are not in an epistemic position to di-
vine risk in individual cases, and thus we must rely on an average
assessment of risk. But this is certainly not the case in the context
of derived organisms (compare, e.g., the derivation of cattle from
the derivation of cholera), and thus it is not clear why it should
be the case for artiﬁcial organisms.
Alternatively, one might claim that, even if we can distinguish
lower- and higher-risk artiﬁcial organisms, we could not create
the lower-risk variants without also facilitating the creation of
higher-risk variants. Thus, we should assess a particular instance
of creating artiﬁcial life in part by assessing the average or maxi-
mal risks associated with the other instances of creating artiﬁcial
life that it might facilitate. But again, we can frequently derive
low-risk organisms without contributing to the derivation of
high-risk ones, and it is unclear why the situation should be any
different for the creation of artiﬁcial organisms.
In short, the risk-based variant of the playing God concern is
most forceful when understood narrowly, but understood thus, it
is highly doubtful that it applies speciﬁcally to the creation of arti-
ﬁcial life—and hence it is highly doubtful that it can ground the
claim that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁcant. What
matters is the nature of the life in question and its causal powers;
not how it was derived.
Similar thoughts apply to the expressivist variant of the play-
ing God objection. Understood narrowly, this variant would ap-
ply more powerfully to the creation of artiﬁcial organisms than5 Similar considerations led the Task Group on Issues in Sample Return, a body of the Spa
posed by the introduction of extra-terrestrial microbes to earth would be minimal.to the derivation of similar organisms only if the former would
express more objectionable attitudes than the latter. But what
attitudes the production of an organism expresses plausibly de-
pends on what attitudes the creator of that organism actually
has, not on the nature of the means via which the organism
was created, and there seems no reason to suppose that a syn-
thetic biologist who creates an artiﬁcial organisms must hold
more objectionable attitudes than a molecular biologist who
modiﬁes an existing organism. Both scientists could (though
need not) be driven by arrogance or other grandiose motives,
and both scientists could (though need not) be motivated by a
desire to master nature. Perhaps it could be argued that the very
same motives and attitudes that would be unobjectionable in a
scientist seeking to modify or manipulate existing organisms
would be objectionable in a scientist seeking to create artiﬁcial
life, but it is unclear what could justify drawing such a
distinction.
By contrast, on a broader interpretation of the expressivist
concern, the concern applies more powerfully to the creation of
artiﬁcial life than to the derivation of life provided the former
is typically associated with more objectionable attitudes than
the latter. Moreover, it is not clear why we should accept broader
interpretation of the concern. If a particular instance of creating
artiﬁcial life were associated with objectionable attitudes, it is
at least somewhat plausible to say that it would, as a result, be
morally problematic. However, it is difﬁcult to see why the crea-
tion of artiﬁcial life should be thought morally problematic when
not associated with objectionable attitudes merely because other
instances of creating artiﬁcial life are associated with such
attitudes.
Like the risk-based variant of the playing God concern, the
expressivist variant is most forceful when understood narrowly,
but understood thus, it is highly doubtful that it applies speciﬁcally
to the creation of artiﬁcial life—and hence it is highly doubtful that
it can ground the claim that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally
signiﬁcant.
3. Attempt two: encouraging reductionism
In an early paper on the ethics of synthetic biology, (Mildred
Cho and collaborators, 1999) set forward another possible ground
for the moral signiﬁcance of creating artiﬁcial life. They suggest
that the creation of artiﬁcial life could lead to the widespread
acceptance of a reductionism about life according to which life is
‘‘nothing more’’ than a set of biochemical components, or, more
restrictively, a set of genes. They worry that this, in turn, might
undermine ‘‘the special status of living things and the value that
we ascribe to life’’. The claim, it seems, is that the knowledge gen-
erated by and practices associated with synthetic biology will
cause people to no longer regard the distinction between living
and non-living things as important. But—so the argument goes—
this distinction is important, for it marks a difference in value: Liv-
ing things possess, in virtue of being alive, some value that non-liv-
ing things lack. We have moral reasons not to bring it about that
people assign no signiﬁcance, or less signiﬁcance than is due, to
this moral distinction. Thus, we have moral reasons not to create
artiﬁcial life.
Is this concern peculiar to the creation of artiﬁcial life? Cho and
collaborators do not go on to contrast the creation of artiﬁcial life
with the derivation of similar life, but one can imagine how such a
contrast might be drawn. On their view, the creation of artiﬁcial
life makes it difﬁcult to sustain the belief that there is somethingce Studies Board of the US National Research Council, to conclude in 1997 that the risk
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chemical building blocks: the thought is presumably that it will be
difﬁcult to explain how this ‘something more’ could reliably be
produced merely by arranging chemical components. By contrast,
there is arguably no comparable problem posed by the demonstra-
tion that one living thing can be derived from another, for in that
case, one may suppose that the ‘something more’ property is trans-
ferred from the ancestral organism to its descendant organism.
Reductionism about life can be understood as an ontological
thesis or an epistemic claim about explanation or inter-theoretic
relations. Virtually all biologists and philosophers of biology are
physicalists—they maintain that all things in the universe are
either physical or supervene on (roughly: are determined by) the
physical. However, very few philosophers of biology endorse any
version of the reductionist thesis. They almost universally reject
the notion that general biological theories (such as the theory of
natural selection or Mendelian genetics) can be reduced to phys-
ico-chemical theories, even in principle. They are equally sceptical
that biological explanations, which refer to biological kinds such as
species, populations, organisms, traits, cells, genes et cetera, can be
successfully translated into explanations that cite only molecular
biological kinds. The failure of theoretical and explanatory reduc-
tionism in biology is not a symptom of human epistemic limita-
tions, but rather a reﬂection of the genuinely hierarchical
structure of the biological world (Kitcher, 1984)—in other words,
these forms of reductionism fail because ontological reductionism
is false.
Whether the simultaneous commitment to physicalism and
anti-reductionism on all fronts poses a conﬂict that biologists
and philosophers of science need to reconcile is beyond the scope
of this article (for a discussion, see Rosenberg & Kaplan, 2005).
What matters for our purposes is this: even if creating artiﬁcial life
demonstrates that the physico-chemical facts ﬁx the biological
facts, all this shows is that biological properties supervene on
physical properties—a version of the physicalism thesis that essen-
tially every philosopher of science and biologist already accepts.6
Only a vitalist would dispute this. The creation of artiﬁcial life may
thus be viewed as contradicting vitalism, but vitalism was discred-
ited as an unscientiﬁc and empirically unsupported hypothesis long
before synthetic biology came along.
One might argue that the creation of artiﬁcial life would support
methodological reductionism—a research strategy holding that the
most effective way to investigate the properties of complex sys-
tems is to decompose them into their lowest level parts. Synthetic
biology has often taken this reductionist approach by emphasizing
rational design principles that make use of standardized parts with
well-understood properties, such as biobricks™. But synthetic biol-
ogists also frequently rely on directed evolution to tap into subtle
causal interactions that are invisible to genetic engineers and re-
calcitrant to standard engineering manipulation—suggesting that
the reductionist approach to building organisms to speciﬁcation
may be of limited efﬁcacy (for a discussion see Lewens, this issue),
in part due the emergent properties of complex systems (Bedau,
2008). If synthetic biology is supposed to support the methodolog-
ical thesis of reductionism by showing that the properties of the
whole can be predicted and controlled by understanding the prop-
erties of the parts, it has done so with limited success. Even if it
were successful, however, it is not clear why a reductionist scien-
tiﬁc methodology should have any implications whatsoever for
ethics.
We have been assuming that Cho et al. are concerned about the
possible reduction of biological properties to physico–chemical
properties. However it may be that they have a different kind of6 For classic statements of a non-reductive physicalist position, see Davidson (1970) anreductionism in mind. For example, perhaps they are concerned
rather about the ontological reduction of organismic properties to
genetic properties. As we noted, virtually no biologist would accept
a metaphysical theory that relegates organisms, traits, and cells to
the illusory—and what’s more, there is no reason to immunize
genes from this relegation, given that the ontological status of
the gene is heavily contested (see Grifﬁths & Stotz, 2006). Neither
would anyone claim that organismic properties are identical to ge-
netic properties. Genes do not determine organismic properties in
the way that sub-atomic elements determine the physical proper-
ties of atomic elements. And unlike neuronal states which may be
synchronic with mental states, genetic states are well removed in
space and time from, and thus cannot be identiﬁed with, their ulti-
mate effects on the phenotype, which are mediated by a patchwork
of intervening causes.
Alternatively, perhaps Cho and collaborators are concerned that
the creation of artiﬁcial life would support a kind of explanatory ge-
netic reductionism according to which the phenotypic properties
of an organism are to be causally explained wholly or primarily
by reference to the organism’s genes. At ﬁrst glance, the success
of JCVI’s synthetic genome does seems to imply that genes are a
controlling causal inﬂuence on the development of organismic
properties, as compared say to the cytoplasmic structures of the
host bacteria which was outﬁtted with the synthetic genome.
The mere fact that genes are acting as causal difference-makers
in this case, though, need not generalize to other cases, such as
to the traits of complex animals, which rely more heavily on envi-
ronmental interaction for their development. More importantly,
however, the genetic manipulation of existing genomes has dem-
onstrated the causal inﬂuence of genes with equal rigour: consider,
for example, genetic interventions that have been shown to induce
the development of ectopic organs in fruit ﬂies, such as a com-
pound eye where a wing ordinarily would be. For these reasons,
it is not clear that synthetic biology offers a uniquely powerful
demonstration of genetic reductionism in any of its variations.
Finally, Cho and collaborators might be interpreted as maintain-
ing not that the creation of artiﬁcial life actually supports any of the
abovementioned reductionist theses, but that it would be perceived
to support them. For instance, suppose it were the case that people
who believed that the property of being alive supervened on bio-
chemical properties tended also to believe that life is no more than
a collection of biochemical components, even though this is false. If
so, then to the extent that artiﬁcial life demonstrates superve-
nience relations, it might engender the perception that ontological
reductionism is true.
There are, however, at least two serious problems with this line
of reasoning. First, in the absence of empirical evidence that people
are prone to draw mistaken inferences of this sort, it would seem
uncharitable to assume that they will. Second, even if the creation
of artiﬁcial life were to lead to widespread acceptance of some
form of reductionism, it is not immediately clear why this would
undermine ‘‘the special status of living things and the value
that we ascribe to life’’, as Cho and collaborators fear (Douglas &
Savulescu, 2010). Humans and other beings with moral status are
typically ascribed their special value on grounds other than that
they are alive. It is very doubtful, for example, that bacteria and
protozoa have any moral status (or even value) merely in virtue
of their being alive; most of us would judge that there is nothing
wrong with killing the numerous bacteria lining our skin and intes-
tine or the weeds in our garden, let alone the ﬂies buzzing against
our windows. Rather, moral status is typically attributed to beings
in virtue of the mental capacities they or normal members of their
species possess. Typically these are capacities for consciousness,d Kim (1993).
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Since it is a psychological life, rather than biological life, that is ta-
ken to confer moral status, it is not immediately clear why accep-
tance of reductionism about life should have any impact on our
inclination to ascribe such status.
Moreover, even if the view that merely being alive confers no
moral status were false, it is not clear that we would have much
to fear from the creation of life. If this is a false view, it is a false
view that virtually everyone already accepts, at least implicitly,
and those who reject it do so on the basis of sophisticated philo-
sophical theories that are unlikely to be affected by the creation
of artiﬁcial life. Thus, it is unlikely that the creation of artiﬁcial life
would make any difference to the number of people who hold the
view.
Perhaps what Cho and collaborators are concerned about is that
acceptance of reductionism would engender a frivolous attitude
towards life: people might start creating new life forms willy–nilly,
in much the same way that children might create different col-
oured compounds with elementary chemistry sets, which is incon-
sistent with treating life as something that is ‘sacred’ or worthy of
respect. Perhaps this would be problematic even if the life forms
created lacked moral status. We have already noted, however, that
merely being alive is not ordinarily thought to demand respect;
moreover, life can easily be created now using sexual reproduction
and it can be radically modiﬁed using breeding or genetic engi-
neering. It is thus hard to see how synthetic biology raises new
concerns of this sort.
In sum, it is not clear that the creation of artiﬁcial life would
encourage acceptance of any version of the reductionist thesis.
And even if it did, it is not clear that this would lead to the accep-
tance of any new and incorrect views regarding the value of life.
4. Attempt three: an argument from evolutionary teleology
A third attempt to establish the moral signiﬁcance of creating
artiﬁcial life draws on the thought, again widely mentioned in dis-
cussions of the JCVI creation, that artiﬁcial organisms would not ﬁt
clearly into our organism–artefact dichotomy, and would thus
have or be perceived to have an uncertain ontological status.7
The uncertain ontological status of artiﬁcial life might create
puzzles for biologists and metaphysicians, but it is not immedi-
ately clear why this would bear negatively on the morality of
creating such life forms. Boldt and Müller (2008, p. 188) suggest
that it might be problematic for reasons which parallel those
offered by Cho and collaborators. They contend that metaphors
often deployed in synthetic biology, such as those comparing
DNA segments to ‘‘Lego bricks’’ and artiﬁcial life to ‘‘living
machines’’, serve to ‘‘identif[y] organisms with artefacts, an identi-
ﬁcation that, given the connection between ‘life’ and ‘value’, may in
the (very) long run lead to a weakening of society’s respect for
higher forms of life that are usually regarded as worthy of protec-
tion’’. However, as we argued in the last section, higher forms of
life are not normally ascribed moral status in virtue of their being
alive, but in virtue of their possessing certain mental capacities,
and it is not clear why undermining the distinction between organ-
isms and artefacts would have any inﬂuence on the signiﬁcance we
assign to mental properties. Thus, in this section, we consider7 We henceforth frame the concern as one about the actual ontological status of artiﬁcial
perceived ontological status.
8 We make no claim as to whether the arguments we make in this section apply to n
organizational maintenance approaches.
9 We thank Simon Rippon for pressing us to consider this puzzle.
10 It might be disputed whether a complex, highly cognitive creature that developed in
development would depend heavily on input from other living systems (such as a social le
fantastically) a chimpanzee-like creature directly created from chemically simple, non-livwhether there might be an alternative way to marshal worries
about the uncertain status of artiﬁcial organisms into an argument
for the moral signiﬁcance of creating artiﬁcial life.
In order to do so, we will understand the worry about the
uncertain ontological status of artiﬁcial organisms as a worry
about uncertain functional status. For as we will see, uncertain
functional status can lead to uncertain moral status, insofar as
moral status is tied to interests, and interests are tied to functions.
Many biologists and philosophers of biology would accept that or-
dinary organisms have a functional status: they can aptly be de-
scribed as functioning well, or functioning poorly. According to
the dominant ‘etiological’ account of function, the function of a
trait is the effect for which that trait was selected—that is, the ef-
fect that causally explains the proliferation and maintenance of
that trait in a population lineage via mechanisms of natural selec-
tion (Neander, 1991). We call this account of function Evolutionary
Teleology. Notwithstanding persuasive arguments for functional
pluralism (Amundson & Lauder, 1994), Evolutionary Teleology re-
mains the prevailing approach to function in biology.8
If one believes that the functional status of ordinary living
things depends on their evolutionary etiology in the way speciﬁed
by Evolutionary Teleology, then a puzzle arises concerning what
would determine the functional status of artiﬁcial organisms, since
these do not evolve via a process of natural selection but rather are
created de novo to the speciﬁcations of rational agents.9 One possi-
bility is that the functional status of an artiﬁcial organism might be
determined in the same way as the functional status of non-living
artefacts. A non-living artefact is, plausibly, well-functioning to the
extent that it realises or acts in accordance with functions that are
conferred on it by the rational agents that created or use it. For
example, the function of a calculator is to accurately perform math-
ematical calculations because it was created, and is used, with this
goal in mind.
However it seems doubtful whether the functional status of an
artiﬁcial organism would (or would always) be determined in this
way. Suppose that it were possible to create an artiﬁcial entity with
all of the characteristics of a typical chimpanzee embryo and to de-
velop such an embryo into an entity with characteristics of a typ-
ical adult chimpanzee. Suppose further that a scientist created
such an artiﬁcial chimpanzee for the sole purpose of using it in
medical experiments.10 It is highly doubtful that we would charac-
terize this artiﬁcial chimpanzee as well-functioning in virtue of the
fact that it was a good experimental subject (for example, it was doc-
ile, a good model for human diseases, and so on). It is tempting to
think instead that the functional status of this artiﬁcial chimpanzee
would be determined by the same considerations that would deter-
mine the functional status of similar, non-artiﬁcial chimpanzees.
However, if the functional status of ordinary chimpanzees is deter-
mined by backward-looking Evolutionary Teleology, which refers to
a history of natural selection for phenotypic effects, then it does
not appear that the functional status of a non-evolved being, such
as our artiﬁcial chimpanzee, could be determined in precisely the
same way.
Various conclusions might be drawn from this problem (see
e.g. Neander, 1996). One possible lesson would be that we
should reject the extension of Evolutionary Teleology to artiﬁ-
cial beings. But this would arguably lead us with signiﬁcantorganisms, but the argument could straightforwardly be reformulated in terms of their
on-evolutionary accounts of biological function, such as dispositional, causal role or
the normal way from an artiﬁcial embryo would really count as artiﬁcial, since its
arning environment). Readers unconvinced that it would may instead imagine (more
ing components according to the design of a rational agent.
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could claim that their functional status can be determined by
reference to the closest possible natural, evolved being. However,
as artiﬁcial organisms become increasingly different from any
evolved life form, reference to the functional status of existing
organisms would surely become increasingly irrelevant to the
functional status of artiﬁcial life. Absent some other means of
determining the latter’s functional status, there would be uncer-
tainty in this regard. Moreover, even in a case where an artiﬁcial
organism does closely resemble some natural, evolved being, one
might reasonably doubt why the provenance of that natural
being should be relevant to the functional status of its artiﬁcial
equivalent. Even in this case, there might be signiﬁcant func-
tional uncertainty.
Uncertainty regarding the functional status of artiﬁcial moral
patients might have moral signiﬁcance. Suppose we accept the fol-
lowing Aristotelian view, which would command signiﬁcant philo-
sophical support:
Prudential Functionalism: an organism has an interest in func-
tioning well.
That is to say, it is good for an organism to function well, or,
equivalently, functioning well is prudentially valuable. If Prudential
Functionalism is correct, then the uncertain functional status of
artiﬁcial organisms will imply that it is also uncertain what interests
that organism possesses, since interests are, on this view, tied to
functions. Now suppose that we accept a further view, which would
also command signiﬁcant philosophical support:
Moral Prudentialism: an organism’s interests give rise to moral
protections (i.e., moral reasons to promote, protect or refrain
from setting back those interests).
If Moral Prudentialism is correct, then it will follow in turn that it is
uncertain what moral protections, if any, artiﬁcial organisms enjoy,
since moral protections are dependent on interests, and the inter-
ests of artiﬁcial organisms are uncertain due to their uncertain
functional status. In this way, functional uncertainty leads to moral
uncertainty.
This moral uncertainty creates a risk that artiﬁcial organisms
might be treated in ways that are morally wrong because the
scope or strength of the moral protections enjoyed by those
organisms is underestimated. This sort of risk is familiar from
other domains that have been well studied by medical and ani-
mal ethicists. For instance, it is arguably uncertain what moral
protections human embryos, foetuses and neonates, severely
cognitively impaired adult humans, and many nonhuman ani-
mals enjoy, and this uncertainty creates a risk that such beings
are treated wrongfully. Some would argue that abortion, non-
treatment of comatose patients, and animal farming practices
are examples of wrongful treatment that follow, in part, from
the underestimation of the strength and breadth of the moral
protections enjoyed by these organisms. Take the case of agricul-
tural animals: cows, pigs and chickens were designed through a
deliberate process of selective breeding to serve as a human food
resource. Perhaps the unusually (and arguably unjustiﬁably)
harsh treatment of agricultural animals is due in part to their
having an uncertain functional status—one that is taken to be
tied in part to human interests, rather than generated solely
by their own evolutionary history. This might also explain the
asymmetrical moral attitudes that many people hold toward
the human treatment of wild and agricultural animals,
respectively.11 There would, of course, be signiﬁcant disagreement about which beings fall into thisOf course, it is not always morally wrong, all things considered,
to create organisms at risk of wrongful treatment. This can be seen
by considering the case of human embryos and foetuses. Though it
is arguably uncertain what moral protections these entities enjoy,
and though this arguably creates some risk of wrongful treatment,
it is surely often permissible to create human embryos or foetuses.
Nevertheless, the risk that an entity will be treated in morally
wrongful ways may signiﬁcantly weaken the case for (or strength-
en the case against) creating such an entity. Consider that the
breeding of farm animals is more defensible when there is a low
risk that those animals will be treated wrongfully than when there
is a high risk. Similarly, the creation of artiﬁcial organisms might
be less defensible than the creation of other organisms whose
functional status is less uncertain, and which are thus at lower risk
of wrongful treatment.
The argument that we have outlined can be summarized as fol-
lows: if the functional status of ordinary, evolved organisms is
determined by their evolutionary origins in the way speciﬁed by
Evolutionary Teleology, then the functional status of such organisms
can be ascertained by determining whether they possesses those
traits that were favoured by natural selection in their ancestors.
However, the functional status of artiﬁcial organisms cannot be
ascertained in this way, and this means that their functional status
is uncertain. But, since organisms have an interest in functioning
well (Prudential Functionalism), it follows that it is uncertain what
interests artiﬁcial organisms have. And, since interests generate
moral protections (Moral Prudentialism), this translates into uncer-
tainty about what moral protections artiﬁcial organisms would en-
joy. This in turn creates a risk that artiﬁcial organisms would be
treated wrongfully—because the strength or breadth of their moral
protections would be underestimated. And ﬁnally, this risk weak-
ens the moral case for (or strengthens the moral case against) cre-
ating these life forms.
The premises of this argument—henceforth ‘the argument
from evolutionary teleology’—might seem to be somewhat plausi-
ble when assessed in isolation from one another. However, the
conjunction of these premises is not plausible. In particular,
acceptance of three of them—Evolutionary Teleology, Prudential
Functionalism and Moral Prudentialism—generates implausible re-
sults. An ordinary bacterium is an evolved organism which,
according to Evolutionary Teleology, has a functional status. Since
an ordinary bacterium has a functional status, it also, pursuant
to Prudential Functionalism, has interests; it is good for that organ-
ism to function well. Moreover, according to Moral Prudentialism,
these interests generate moral protections. Thus, even bacteria,
among the simplest forms of life, enjoy moral protections. If cor-
rect, this would mean that we have moral reasons to promote,
protect, or not set back the interests of bacteria. Most would ﬁnd
this implication unacceptable. It is certainly wildly out of line
with common sense morality, according to which we have no
moral reason to refrain from killing bacteria. Indeed, this is the
central problem with biocentric accounts of moral status. We re-
main open to the possibility that the functional status of bacteria
and other very simple life forms may be determined by Evolution-
ary Teleology or some variant of it. But if it is, then either Pruden-
tial Functionalism or Moral Prudentialism will need to be rejected
in order to avoid the implausible implication that simple organ-
isms enjoy moral protections.
To avoid this implication, the proponent of the argument from
evolutionary teleology might seek to restrict the scope of the argu-
ment so that it applies only to ‘higher organisms’, by which we
mean organisms that can plausibly be taken to enjoy moral protec-
tions, for example, those that are conscious.11 There are three maincategory.
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of Evolutionary Teleology so that it applies not to all evolved organ-
isms, but only to evolved higher organisms. This might allow one
to maintain that lower organisms possess no functional status. This
is not a theoretically viable alternative, however, since it would re-
sult in a fragmented account of organismic function, drawing lines
in unacceptably arbitrary ways from the standpoint of non-norma-
tive biological science. Second, we could restrict the scope of Pruden-
tial Functionalism so that it applies only to higher life forms—a move
which might allow one to maintain that, even if lower organisms
have a functional status, they have no interests. Third, one could re-
strict the scope of Moral Prudentialism. This would allow one to ac-
cept that lower organisms have functions and hence interests, but
to deny that these interests generate any signiﬁcant moral
protections.
This is not the place to defend a view as to which of the latter
two amendments should be made, but it should be noted that
either amendment would constitute a signiﬁcant concession. The
new, restricted variant of the argument from evolutionary teleol-
ogy would now no longer establish that the creation of simple arti-
ﬁcial organisms, such as the JCVI bacterium, is morally signiﬁcant.
It would at most succeed in establishing the moral signiﬁcance of
creating higher artiﬁcial organisms, for only then would the prob-
lem of uncertain moral protections arise. Nevertheless, this is in it-
self an interesting conclusion. In addition, although on this
argument the creation of simple artiﬁcial organisms would not
count as morally signiﬁcant, it might nevertheless be morally
interesting in an indirect way: it might be an ominous sign of
things to come, namely, the creation of higher artiﬁcial organisms.
But would a suitably restricted variant of the argument from
teleology succeed even in demonstrating the moral signiﬁcance
of creating higher artiﬁcial organisms? There are two reasons to be-
lieve that it would not.
First, even in its restricted form, the argument has implausible
implications. Since it assigns signiﬁcant moral protections only to
higher beings, it avoids the problem of scope—of implying that
the range of organisms covered by moral protections is too wide.
However, it has implausible implications for the content of those
moral protections that it does ascribe.
Take the case of humans. According to the restricted argument
from evolutionary teleology, humans enjoy moral protections that
derive ultimately from the process via which they evolved. They
are functioning well to the extent that they exhibit those traits that
were favoured by natural selection in the evolution of their human
ancestors. They thus have an interest in possessing those traits, and
others have moral reasons to promote, protect or not set back the
development and maintenance of those traits. But it is plausible
that, for example, the evolutionarily given functions of the human
brain include the generation of xenophobic psychological disposi-
tions. These dispositions, and resulting hostility to out-groups,
are characteristic of humans in a wide range of cultural environ-
ments and were probably favoured in our evolutionary past during
periods of intense ecological competition between human groups.
The restricted argument from evolutionary teleology thus implies
that there are moral reasons to protect, promote or refrain from
setting back the development and maintenance of xenophobic ten-
dencies. This, we take it, is implausible.
The restricted variant of the argument from evolutionary teleol-
ogy also has implausible implications for the content of the inter-
ests that it ascribes to higher beings. For example, it implies that
a brain dead individual has an interest in having his body sustained
by life support, even where he has previously rejected such sup-
port. Maintaining the body of a brain dead individual preserves12 Chimeric organisms contain a mixture of cells from two or more species. They can besome of his functioning—where functions are determined by Evolu-
tionary Teleology—but most would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to accept that a
brain dead individual has any interest in continued existence ex-
cept perhaps where the individual previously wished to be main-
tained in such a state.
Not only does the argument from evolutionary teleology imply
that organisms possess interests and enjoy moral protections that,
intuitively, they do not possess and enjoy, it also makes these
interests and protections implausibly contingent on facts about
the evolutionary etiology of an organism. Consider the ‘swamp
person’, who is exactly like an ordinary person in her non-genea-
logical properties but who, having arisen by chance from the pri-
mordial soup, has no history of selection to confer etiological
biological functions. It seems very doubtful that, on discovering
that someone whom we thought was an ordinary person was in
fact a swamp person, we would change our views as to the inter-
ests or moral protections that the person possesses. Likewise, if
synthetic biologists did manage to construct a human embryo en-
tirely from scratch, and this developed into a human person, that
person would, intuitively, be entitled to the same rights and priv-
ileges as another person, despite her curious origin. What matters,
again, is not origin, but mental capacity.
The restricted argument from evolutionary teleology has coun-
ter-intuitive implications, both regarding what moral protections
higher organisms enjoy and regarding what determines the exis-
tence of such protections.
In addition to these implausible implications, there is a further
reason to doubt whether the argument from teleology, in either its
general or restricted form, establishes the moral signiﬁcance of
creating artiﬁcial organisms. As with concerns about playing God,
it is not clear that that the argument is sufﬁciently speciﬁc to
artiﬁcial life.
According to both the general and restricted versions of the
argument from evolutionary teleology, the problem with creating
(higher) artiﬁcial organisms is that, because it would be unclear
what moral protections they enjoy, there is a risk that they would
be treated wrongfully. This problem arises, according to the argu-
ment, because artiﬁcial organisms are not evolved. As a result, their
functional status is not determined by Evolutionary Teleology, and it
is unclear what else determines their functional status. However,
organisms derived from existing ones, such as via genetic modiﬁ-
cation or more radically by chimerization, are also not straightfor-
wardly the products of natural selection.12 The ﬁnal steps in the
creation of genetically modiﬁed and chimeric entities were altera-
tions brought about intentionally by rational agents. Thus, they too
might seem to have an uncertain functional status.
On the one hand, the functional status of derived organisms
could be determined by the same considerations that determine
the functional status of non-living artefacts: that is, by whether
they fulﬁl the purposes of the rational agents who designed and
use them (although this might have unattractive implications of
the sort suggested above). On the other hand, one might think that
the functional status of derived organisms would be determined, at
least in part, by considerations regarding their evolutionary past.
For example, it could be that such an organism is functioning well
just in case it possesses those traits which were favoured by natu-
ral selection in the evolution of its most proximate fully evolved
ancestor. Alternatively, it could be that the functional status of de-
rived organisms is determined by a mixture of evolutionary con-
siderations and facts about the purposes of the agents who
create and use them.
A reasonable lesson to draw from this discussion would be that,
insofar as Evolutionary Teleology determines the functional statuscreated by fusing the embryos of two different species.
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derived through traditional genetic engineering practices is, like
that of organisms created artiﬁcially, uncertain. If this is right, then
concerns about creating beings with uncertain functional status
are not speciﬁc to the creation of artiﬁcial organisms. Indeed they
probably apply equally powerfully to the production all organisms
(or all higher organisms) that are not wholly the product of undi-
rected evolution and whose functional status therefore cannot
straightforwardly be determined via Evolutionary Teleology.
We argued above that, insofar as the functional status of natu-
ral, evolved organisms is determined by Evolutionary Teleology,
there is reason to deny that functional status determines moral
status, for it is implausible that the moral protections enjoyed by
such organisms are determined by their evolutionary genealogy.
What matters for moral status are an organism’s non-genealogical
properties, such as its mental capacities. We have now argued fur-
ther that, even if evolutionary genealogy were relevant to moral
status, the resulting uncertainty about the moral status of non-
evolved creatures would apply as much to derived organisms as
to artiﬁcial ones.
5. Conclusion
We have developed and evaluated three attempts to establish
that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁcant. These ap-
pealed respectively to concerns about playing God; to the possibil-
ity that the creation of such beings encourages reductionism and
thus undermines the special status accorded to life; and to the
thought that, since artiﬁcial life forms would have an uncertain
functional status, they would also have an uncertain moral status.
We argued that none of these attempts succeeds in establishing
the moral signiﬁcance of creating artiﬁcial life. It does not, of
course, follow that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally insignif-
icant, for there may be some other way of establishing its signiﬁ-
cance that we have missed. However, we believe that the
attempts we have considered constitute the most charitable ways
of understanding the most prominent arguments for the moral
signiﬁcance of artiﬁcial life. We thus believe that we have left
the view that the creation of artiﬁcial life is morally signiﬁcant
on signiﬁcantly shakier ground.
Though we have not argued for this view here, we believe that
the capacity to create kinds of life that could never naturally exist
does raise deep moral issues about the interests of those beings,
their moral status, and the risks they pose to other beings. How-
ever, in our view, what matters, in answering those questions, is
not how life is created but what non-genealogical properties it has.
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